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The Haitian Vacation: The Applicability of Sham 
Doctrine to Year-End Divorces 
By enacting the 1969 Tax Reform Act, 1 Congress created 
new tax rates for single individuals to reduce the tax advantages 
enjoyed by married persons.2 Ironically, the new rates made 
some married couples - those in which both spouses earn similar 
incomes - pay higher taxes than identical unmarried couples. 
What had been the protected class became the abused class.3 
Two examples reveal the discrepancy: a marriage where one 
spouse earns $12,000 and the other earns $4,000 will pay $127 
more than if the pair were single; if both spouses earn $30,000, 
they will lose $3,970 more to taxes than their unmarried counter-
parts. 4 
This "marriage penalty" is not inescapable. The Internal 
Revenue Code determines marital status for tax purposes on De-
cember 31 of each year and provides that couples separated on 
that date under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance shall 
not be considered married.5 Thus, a clever couple might benefit 
from lower tax rates by divorcing on December 30 and celebrating 
the New Year with remarriage. 
Although Congress probably did not expect the 1969 Tax 
Reform Act6 to be an incentive for separation, married couples 
began contemplating tax avoidance by divorce soon after its pas-
sage. In 1972, testimony before the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee disclosed that "[people] are really considering getting 
divorced on December 30 and remarrying on January 2. This is a 
ridiculous situation, but certainly possible; tax savings perhaps 
could finance a vacation to Haiti in order to get that quick di-
1. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (the relevant portions are 
codified at I.R.C. § l(c)). 
2. See S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19, 260 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 
C.B. 425, 587. 
3. Eighteen million married couples faced the disparate rates of the revised tax 
schedule. See Tax Treatment of Single Persons and Married Persons Where Both Spouses 
are Working: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 2d Seas. 
96 (1972) (statement of Edward I. Koch) [hereinafter cited as Hearings). 
4. Id. at 80 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen). The marriage tax has withstood constitu-
tional challenge under the due process and the equal protection clauses, Mapes v. United 
States, 576 F.2d 896 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ind. 
1976), affd. sub nom. Barter v. United States, 550 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 1012 (1978). 
5. 1.R.C. §§ 143, 6013. 
6. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487. 
1332 
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vorce."7 Tax-related divorces received even more public attention 
in 1976 when the television show "60 Minutes" featured case 
studies of marriages dissolved to save taxes.8 
After the "60 Minutes" program, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice discussed the problem hypothetically in Revenue Ruling 
76-255:9 If C and D secure a valid divorce on December 30 in a 
foreign jurisdiction, and at that time intend to remarry and do 
remarry in January, can C and D file returns as single individu-
als? The Commissioner held: 
Neither section 143 nor section 6013 .of the Code or the applicable 
regulations thereunder contemplates a "sham transaction" de-
signed to manipulate for Federal income tax purposes an individ-
ual's marital status as of the close of a taxable year. See Gregory 
v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465. 
Accordingly, C and D for purposes of sections 143 and 6013 of 1 
the Code were married individuals as of the close of the taxable 
year 1975. Therefore, for 1975 they must file either a joint Federal 
income tax return or separate returns . . . .10 
The Commissioner's Ruling S\Jggests that the Internal Revenue 
Service will challenge divorces obtained in foreign jurisdictions11 
whenever the couples intend to, and do immediately, remarry. 
But although the Service has consistently upheld Revenue Ruling 
7. Hearings, supra note 3, at 45 (statement of Florence B. Donahue). 
8. CBS NEWS, 60 MINUTES, Marriage and Taxes (March 7, 1976, produced by M. 
Goldin). 
9. Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40. 
10. Id. at 40-41. 
11. It is doubtful that the foreign-jurisdiction language in Rev. Rul. 76-255 would be 
interpreted to limit the holding to divorces in foreign countries. The Service has applied 
Rev. Rul. 76-255 in two private Letter Rulings: Ltr. Rul. 7835076 (June 1, 1978) and Ltr. 
Rul. 7830156 (April 29, 1978). Only one of the two Letter Rulings (Ltr. Ru!. 7835076) 
involved a divorce in a foreign nation. 
However, the challenge of a divorce in a foreign country as a sham may have greater 
merit than an attack on a state divorce decree. Foreign divorce decrees are entitled not to 
full faith and credit, but rather to comity. The relationship between the two was explained 
by the Ninth Circuit in Montemurro v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.: 
The Mexican divorce decree was not entitled to recognition by virtue of the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution (Art. IV, Sec. 1) but rather was gov-
erned by considerations of comity. "Thus, under comity - as contrasted with full 
faith and credit - our courts have power to deny even prima facie validity to the 
judgments of foreign countries for policy reasons, despite whatever allegations of 
jurisdiction may appear on the face of such foreign judgments." 
409 F.2d 832, 833 (9th Cir. 1969) (quoting Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 375, 
130 N.E.2d 902, 903 (1955)). 
Therefore, a court might find that a divorce in a foreign country for tax purposes 
would violate public policy while feeling bound by a similar state decree. The Service, 
however, has yet to draw this distinction. 
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76-255 in subsequent letter rulings12 only recently has it chal-
lenged a year-end divorce scheme in court. 13 
This Note examines the propriety of applying the sham doc-
trine to tax-motivated divorces. Section I outlines the evolution 
of the sham doctrine from its exposition in Gregory v. Helvering 14 
through its expression in two different tests for commercial trans-
actions. Section II then studies the relationship between state 
divorce law and the marital status provisions of the Internal Rev-
enue Code15 to demonstrate the clear congressional preference for 
incorporating state law by reference rather than creating an inde-
pendent federal law of marriage. It also examines the history of 
the 1969 Tax Reform Act in a vain effort to discern a congres-
sional desire to impose a marriage penalty. Finally, Section III 
concludes that the IRS should not be permitted to use sham 
theory to attack year-end divorces until it receives an explicit 
congressional directive to that effect. 16 
I. GREGORY V. HELVERING AND THE TAX SHAM DOCTRINE 
In 1935, the Supreme Court in Gregory v. Helvering11 enun-
ciated guidelines for declaring a transaction a sham. Gregory 
owned United Mortgage Corporation, which held 1000 shares of 
Monitor Securities Corporation stock. She created a new corpora-
tion, Averill, and transferred the Monitor shares to the new com-
12. Ltr. Rul. 7830156 (April 29, 1978); Ltr. Rul. 7835076 (June 1, 1978). 
13. The Service finally decided to test Rev. Rul. 76-255 when it challenged the returns 
of Angela and David Boyter. The Boyters have divorced and remarried around New Year's 
three times since 1966, admittedly for tax purposes. New York Times, Sept. 11, 1979, 
§ A, at 11, col. 1. They filed separate actions contesting the Service's challenge. David 
Boyter v. Commissioner, No. 11445-77 (T.C., filed Nov. 16, 1977); Angela Boyter v. Com-
missioner, No. 11446-77 (T.C., filed Nov. 16, 1977). 
14. 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
15. I.R.C. §§ 143, 6013. 
16. This Note analyzes only the feasibility of attacking year-end divorces under the 
sham doctrine. The Service might also attack a year-end divorce in a foreign jurisdiction 
by alleging that it is invalid under the law of the couple's domicile. This tactic has the 
advantage of maintaining the deference that the Service and the federal courts have 
accorded to state determinations of marital status. See notes 39-67 infra and accompany-
ing text. However, the Service would face two imposing obstacles should it choose such 
an attack. First, it is unclear whether the Service, as a third party, would have standing 
to challenge the validity of the couple's foreign divorce decree under the law of their state 
of domicile. Second, even if the service had standing, the domicile state is likely to 
recognize the foreign decree as long as the divorce proceeding is not ex parte. See R. 
LEFLAR, AMERICAN CoNFLICI'S LAW § 224 (3d ed. 1977). And couples sufficiently sophisti-
cated to invest the time and expense involved in a year-end divorce scheme are not likely 
to sabotage that scheme with an ex parte divorce. 
17. 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
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pany, personally receiving Averill's shares in return. When Aver-
ill dissolved six days later, Gregory acquired the Monitor shares 
and claimed that she did not have to recognize income, since the 
transfer derived from corporate reorganization. 
Although the creation of Averill and the transfer of the shares 
fit the statutory definition of reorganization, 18 the Gregory Court 
found that Congress intended a corporate reorganization to be 
motivated by a "business or corporate purpose" other than tax 
reduction. 19 The Court held that since Gregory created Averill 
only to convey stock, her reorganization was not within the pur-
view of the statute. In reaching this conclusion, the Gregory Court 
articulated the basic tenet of the tax sham doctrine: 
The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what other-
wise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which 
the law permits cannot be doubted. . . . But the question for de-
termination is whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, 
was the thing which the statute intended. 20 
Thus, if a transaction "lies outside the plain intent of the stat-
ute, "21 then to uphold it "would be to exalt artifice above reality 
and to deprive the statutory provision . . . of all serious pur-
pose. "22 That principle gives courts a tool for voiding transactions 
that fit within the letter, but not the spirit, of the tax code.23 
Courts have used two different tests to appraise transactions 
under Gregory. The first -,- the "beneficial interest test" - was 
inspired by Learned Hand's dissent in Gilbert v. Commissioner.24 
According to Hand, 
If. . . the taxpayer enters into a transaction that does not appreci-
ably affect his beneficial interest except to reduce his tax, the law 
will disregard it. . . . When a taxpayer supposes that transaction, 
in addition to its effect on his tax, will promote his beneficial 
interests in the venture, he will of course secure the desired reduc-
tion. 25 
Courts adopting the beneficial interest test are concerned primar-
ily with whether "there was any significance to what the parties 
18. Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-562, ch. 582, § 112(g), 45 Stat. 791, 818. 
19. 293 U.S. at 469. 
20. 293 U.S. at 469. 
21. 293 U.S. at 470. 
22. 293 U.S. at 470. 
23. See Estate of Parshelsky, 303 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1962), where the court declared 
that a transaction must be within the "spirit of the [relevant tax code] section." 
24. 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957). 
25. 248 F.2d at 411. 
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did,"26 and they usually infer "significance" from the commercial 
risks in the transaction. Significantly, under the beneficial inter-
est test a tax-reduction motive is not fatal if the transaction ex-
poses the taxpayer to a genuine commercial risk. According to the 
Supreme Court's latest exposition of the sham doctrine, "even a 
'major motive' " to mitigate one's taxes "will not vitiate an other-
wise substantial transaction."27 
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Maysteel Products, Inc. v. 
Commissioner28 clarifies the contours of the beneficial interest 
standard. Maysteel bought $100,000 in bonds, financing the pur-
chase through a promissory note. The corporation amortized the 
bond premium and deducted the amortization from its return. A 
month later Maysteel donated the bonds, subject to its indebted-
ness, to a charitable foundation. The foundation sold them at an 
appreciated value while Maysteel claimed a charitable deduc-
tion. The Commissioner contested the amortization deduction, 
claiming that the bond purchase was a sham transaction "outside 
the plain intent of the statute. "29 The court allowed the deduc-
tion, responding: 
While the end result here was a gift - not a business transaction 
- the bond purchase, loan, note or pledge of collateral, sale of 
bonds, and satisfaction of the loan were in every respect genuine 
financial and commercial transactions. They were real in every 
sense. And the taxpayer was exposed to all of the usual risks in-
volved in such transactions. It incurred genuine obligations; risks 
and obligations beyond its control. . . . Taxpayer incurred the 
risk of loss in event of decline in the market; was entitled to benefit 
from any advance; it was not bound to make the gift it ultimately 
did but could have retained the benefits of the transaction. 30 
26. Rothschild v. United States, 407 F.2d 404, 408 (Ct. Cl. 1969). 
27. United States v. Consumer Life Ins. Co., 430 U.S. 725, 739 (1977). See also 
Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960). 
28. 287 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968). For other cases applying the beneficial interest test, 
see Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965); Blueberry Land Co. v. Commissioner, 
361 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1966); Halle v. United States, 346 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1965); Hum-
phreys v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1962); Evans v. Dudley, 295 F.2d 713 (3d 
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 909 (1962); Fabreeka Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 
F.2d 876 (1st Cir. 1961); Diggs v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 326 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 264 
U.S. 908 (1960); Granite Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 670 (1st Cir. 1956); L. Lee 
Stanton, 34 T.C. 1 (1960). When it approved the holding in Granite Trust, the Service 
apparently embraced the notion that the taxpayer's motive is irrelevant if the transaction 
affects a beneficial interest. Rev. Rul. 78-285, 1978-2 C.B. 6. 
29. 287 F.2d at 430. 
30. 287 F.2d at 431. 
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Hence, the beneficial interest test winnows out only those com-
mercial schemes that create no risks or cause no substantive 
change in the taxpayer's position.31 
The second approach courts take when deciding whether a 
transaction is a sham hinges upon the taxpayer's motivation.32 
Although the Gregory Court conceded that taxpayers have a legal 
right to reduce their taxes, it also held that a legitimate corporate 
reorganization must have a nontax purpose. Courts using the 
motive test have interpreted Gregory to mean that transactions 
solely or substantially motivated by tax considerations should be 
disregarded for tax purposes.33 
The holding of the court in Brooke v. United States34 illus-
trates the motive test. Brooke, a doctor, gave an office building 
to his children, holding and renting it as their guardian. The 
Commissioner challenged the transfer as a sham and refused to 
recognize the father's rent deductions, alleging that Brooke con-
veyed the building only to gain those deductions. The taxpayer 
presented a lengthy list of nontax motives for the transaction: to 
provide for the health and education of his children through the 
rent received in trust; to avoid friction with his partners in medi-
cal practice; to insulate assets from the threat of a malpractice 
suit; and to diminish the ethical problem stemming from his 
31. As applied in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), the beneficial interest is 
deceptively simple. The Gregory Court nullified the tax effects of a transaction that 
involved no significant business risks. After stating that a reorganization required a busi-
ness purpose in order to avoid recognition, the Court reasoned that no such purpose was 
present because the new corporation undertook no substantive transactions. 
32. It would be misleading, however, to suggest that courts applying the motive test 
will not also consider the risks involved in the transaction. On the other hand, courts using 
the beneficial interest test are not above peeking at the taxpayer's motives. Indeed, the 
varied interpretations of the Gregory holding led two commentators to state that the 
decision is "all things to all men." B. Bl'ITKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND 
G1IT TAXATION 739 (4th ed. 1972). See also Blum, Knetsch v. United States: A Pronounce-
ment on Tax Avoidance, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 135, 140. Most courts apply the motive test 
where the transaction they wish to invalidate has commercial substance. For a more 
thorough discussion of the interrelationship between the two standards, see Gunn, Tax 
Avoidance, 76 MICH. L. REv. 733 (1978); Blum, Motive, Intent, and Purpose in Federal 
Income Taxation, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 485 (1967); Fuller, Business Purpose, Sham Transac- . 
tions and the Relation of Private Law to the Law of Taxation, 37 TuL. L. REV. 355 (1963). 
33. For courts applying the motive standard, see Barnett v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 
742 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967); Kocin v. United States, 187 F.2d 
707 (2d Cir. 1951); Slifka v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1950). Courts using the 
motive test are in a definite minority. Furthermore, the doctrine has recently come under 
criticism. According to Gunn, "the question whether particular conduct was tax-
motivated should be irrelevant to the decision whether that conduct should be taxed in a 
certain way." Gunn, supra note 32, at 765. 
34. 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972). 
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ownership of a medical practice in the building in which one of 
the tenants was a pharmacy.35 The court stated that "a transfer 
solely to avoid taxes will not be recognized" but held that 
Brooke's gift was not a sham since "[t]he non-tax motives, as 
borne out by the record, are abundant and grounded in economic 
reality. "36 
Revenue Ruling 76-255 seeks to apply the sham doctrine to 
divorce procedures. To support that ruling, the IRS bears a heavy 
burden, for Gregory and its successors have applied the doctrine 
only in cases where it is essential to protect a clear legislative 
purpose.37 The remainder of this Note demonstrates that any 
strong legislative desires are opposed to federalizing divorce law, 
that the most plausible goal protected by applying sham doctrine 
to year-end divorces - taxation of married couples at a higher 
rate than individuals - is not a clear congressional desire, and 
that neither of the two sham doctrine tests are tailored to analyze 
the year-end divorce situation. 
II. THE FEDERAL TAX LAWS, STATE MARRIAGE LAWS, 
AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
Gregory authorizes a court to declare a formally valid com-
mercial transaction invalid for tax purposes whenever the benefi-
cial interest test or the motive test reveals that the transaction is 
not one .that Congress intended the relevant Code provision to 
cover. Under Revenue Ruling 76-255,38 the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice has chosen to use Gregory to challenge year-end divorce and 
remarriage schemes. This Section probes two necessary assump-
tions that the Service must make about congressional intent be-
fore it can invoke Gregory: that Congress intended to create a 
federal marital status independent of state laws, and that Con-
gress had a clear purpose to impose a marriage penalty. If the 
35. 468 F.2d at 1158. 
36. 468 F.2d at 1158. 
37. Courts impose this heavy burden on the IRS in sham cases because the Service 
challenges transactions that comply with the letter of the tax statutes. See Rice, Judicial 
Techniques in Combating Tax Avoidance, 51 Mica. L. REV. 1021 (1953). The challenged 
transaction's literal conformance to the applicable statute requires the IRS to demon-
strate, as the Court held in Gregory v. Helvering, that "the transaction upon its face lies 
outside the plain intent of the statute." 293 U.S. at 470. Consistent with the Gregory 
holding, many courts have stated that "unless Congress makes it abundantly clear," tax 
statutes should not be construed to "be dependent upon the discovery of a purpose, or a 
state of mind .... " Fabreeka Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 876, 878 (1st Cir. 
1961). See also Henry McK. Haserot, 41 T.C. 562, 571 (1964). 
38. Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40. 
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Service cannot support both assumptions, it will not have met the 
sham doctrine's requirement of a clear congressional purpose, and 
enforcement of Revenue Ruling 76-255 must fail. 
A. State Law and the Marital Status Provisions 
of the Revenue Code 
Given the intimate relationship between state law and the 
institution of marriage, 39 it is not surprising that courts have al-
ways used state law to determine marital status under the federal 
tax laws. 40 Before Congress adopted the 1954 Internal Revenue 
Code, courts consistently held that state law defined marital 
status for deductions and for eligibility to file joint returns. In 
the most cited decision, Marriner S. Eccles, 41 Mrs. Eccles 
filed for divorce in Utah and received an interlocutory decree 
on August 2, 1949, that became absolute in February of 1950. 
Mr. Eccles filed a joint return42 for 1949, and the Commissioner 
challenged it, arguing that the interlocutory decree had legally 
separated the parties. The court held that under Utah law the 
interlocutory d~cree did not "end the matrimonial status of the 
parties, nor destroy the economic and social incidents inherent 
in marriage."43 To complete its syllogism and reject the Com-
missioner's view, the court held that state law determined the 
couple's marital status for tax purposes: 
39. In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877), the Court stated: "The State . . . 
has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between 
its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved." 
In Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858), the Court stated, "We dis-
claim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of 
divorce." See also Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899). 
40. It is well settled that state law does not, by its own force, control the application 
of federal tax provisions. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held that state law may 
control where the federal statute, by necessary implication, depends upon it. Barnet v. 
Harmel, 287 U.S. 101, 110 (1932). See also Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 194 (1938); Cahn, 
Local Law in Federal Taxation, 52 YALE L.J. 799, 816 (1943). Courts can dra\\- the neces-
sary implication that marital status under state law is controlling for tax purposes because 
the legislative history of the predecessors of § 6013 and § 143 of the 1954 Code - 26 
U.S.C. § 51(b)(1939) and 26 U.S.C. § 23(aa)(6)(1948) - shows no evidence that Congress 
intended to create an independent federal law to govern marital status. 
41. Marriner S. Eccles, 19 T.C. 1049, nonacq. 1953-2 C.B. 8, affd. per curiam, 208 
F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1953). For other cases following Eccles, see Commissioner v. Ostler, 237 
F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1956); Holcomb v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Cal. 1955), 
affd., 237 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1956); Alice Humphrey Evans, 19 T.C. 1102 (1953), nonacq. 
1953-2 C.B. 8, affd., 211 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1954). 
42. At the time, the joint return provision was § 51 of the 1939 Code, Int. Rev. Code 
of 1939, ch. 1, § 51, 53 Stat. 27, as amended by Act of Oct. 20, 1951, Pub. L. No. 81-183, 
ch. 521, § 312, 65 Stat. 452, 488 (current version at I.R.C. § 6013). 
43. Marriner S. Eccles, 19 T.C. at 1051. 
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Subsection (b)(5)(B) of section 51 [states] "an individual who is 
legally separated from his spouse under a decree of divorce or of 
separate maintenance shall not be considered as married," for pur-
poses of filing a joint return. 
It is plain that whether the petitioner here meets the basic test 
imposed by the language set forth above depends upon his marital 
status as determined by state law for the marital relation. Mar-
riage, its existence and dissolution, is particularly within the prov-
ince of the states. 44 
After Congress enacted the 1954 Code, courts had to decide 
whether the new marital status provisions of sections 143 and 
6013 also looked to state law.45 Most concluded that Congress 
intended state law to control marital status under the revised 
Code, apparently finding that Eccles court's reasoning still per-
suasive. ~6 Of course, where local authorities disagreed about the 
validity of a couple's divorce decree, federal courts had to look 
beyond provincial law;47 at the very least, they had to choose 
which state's laws to respect. 
General Counsel Memorandum 2525048 was the first IRS 
opinion to address the problem of choosing among conflicting 
determinations of marital status by different jurisdictions. In the 
memorandum case, the husband and wife divorced in Mexico 
during 1935. The husband made alimony payments as prescribed 
by a previously signed separation agreement. In 1943, the wife, 
44. 19 T.C. at 1051. See also J.R. Calhoun, Jr., 27 T.C. 115 (1956). 
45. The legislative history of § 6013 and § 143 provides little assistance for this 
endeavor. The committee reports accompanying the 1954 Code indicate generally that 
Congress made no substantive change in the marital status provisions of the 1939 Code. 
See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S. CoDE CoNo. & 
AD. NEWS 4025, 4176, 4543; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in [1954] 
U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4827, 5211; and note 40 supra. 
46. The reasoning in Lee v. Commissioner is typical: 
[W]e must face the question whether for Federal income tax purposes the term 
"husband and wife" is to be construed with reference to State law governing the 
definition and characterization of marital relationships, or whether Congress in• 
tended some nationwide, Federal standard under which a couple could be "hus-
band and wife" for purposes of section 6013 even if under the laws of their particular 
State they would not have that status. This Court has continuously held that for 
purposes of section 6013 and other Code provisions the marital status, its existence 
and dissolution, is defined by State rather than Federal laws. 
64 T.C. 552, 556 (1975). For a similar view, see John T. Untermann, 38 T.C. 93 (1962). 
47. Outside of the conflicts cases, one decision exists denying the conclusiveness of 
state court determinations of marital status. In Daine v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 449 (2d 
Cir. 1948), the Second Circuit held that a state's retroactive judgment of divorce would 
not affect the marital status of the individual for tax purposes in the prior years. 
48. G.C.M. 25250, 1947-2 C.B. 32. 
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following advice that her divorce would probably not be recog-
nized in a state court, obtained a second divorce in Nevada. The 
issue was whether the alleged invalidity of the Mexican decree 
disqualified the husband's alimony deductions49 taken prior to 
the Nevada divorce. Even though the Chief Counsel considered 
it "unlikely" that the couple's state of marital domicile would 
recognize the Mexican decree, he opined that the deductions were 
within "the general intent of Congress in enacting" the alimony 
provisions of the 1939 Code.50 The memo indicated that the cou-
ple's "good faith" reliance on the Mexican decree would bring the 
alimony deductions within the intent of Congress.51 
The Third Circuit followed General Counsel Memorandum 
25250 in Feinberg v. Commissioner, 52 where a New York court 
invalidated a Florida divorce and the Commissioner disallowed 
the husband's alimony deduction. The Feinberg court upheld the 
deduction, claiming that the "mere fact that the marital domicile 
of the parties [New York] did not recognize the Florida divorce 
does not render it a nullity for Federal income tax purposes. " 53 
The court noted that, as in General Counsel Memorandum 25250, 
the husband had relied on the foreign decree.54 
Both Feinberg and the General Counsel Memorandum lay 
dormant for over a decade until the Second Circuit decided 
Estate of Borax v. Commissioner. 55 Herman Borax had obtained 
a Mexican divorce on August 7, 1952, and remarried later that 
month. His first wife challenged the divorce in New York, their 
domicile, and received a decree of invalidation in February 1953. 
The Commissioner claimed that Herman and his second wife 
were not legally married and therefore could not file a joint re-
turn. The Second Circuit held that, for tax purposes, the Mexican 
divorce was controlling: 
49. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, §§ 22(k), 23(u), added by Act of Oct. 21, 1942, 
Pub. L. No. 77-753, ch. 619, § 120, 56 Stat. 798,816 (current versions at I.R.C. §§ 71,215). 
50. G.C.M. 25250, supra note 48, at 33. 
51. Id. The Service cited H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1942), reprinted 
in 1942-2 C.B. 372, as evidence that Congress considered good faith reliance a factor in 
determining marital status for tax purposes. However, an examination of the sections of 
the report that discuss marital status provisions does not indicate the specific method by 
which Congress intended marital status to be determined. See 1942-2 C.B. 409-10, 427-
29. 
52. 198 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1952). 
53. 198 F.2d at 263. 
54. 198 F.2d at 263. 
55. 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966). Later the same year, 
the Second Circuit followed Borax in Wondsel v. Commissioner, 350 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966). 
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[F]or purposes of these provisions of the federal tax statute, and 
within the meaning of these provisions, . . . for the years in dis-
pute Ruth and Herman were divorced under a decree of divorce. 
The subsequent declaration of invalidity by a jurisdiction other 
than the one that decreed the divorce is of no consequence under 
these provisions of tax law.58 
The court cited two justifications for respecting the issuing 
jurisdiction's judgment of validity of a divorce decree. The first 
was the need for a uniform determination of marital status under 
the federal tax laws. The court noted that rote reliance upon state 
law to determine marital status breaks down when a divorce de-
cree is considered valid by one jurisdiction and invalid by an-
other. 57 It stated that "the Supreme Court is not in a position to 
resolve all such sister-state conflicts . . . and it would not be 
advisable for this court (or the Tax Court) to attempt such a 
resolution in these most collateral tax-deficiency proceedings. "0H 
Therefore, the court held that 
the rule of validation avoids a measure of unevenness and uncer-
tainty: all those taxpayers who have obtained a divorce in a partic-
ular jurisdiction are treated the same, regardless of whether the 
spouse against whom the divorce has been obtained is able to, and 
does, invoke the power of another jurisdiction to declare that di-
vorce invalid. 59 
As its second justification for recognizing the Mexican 
divorce, the Borax court adopted the reliance reasoning of Fein-
berg60 and General Counsel Memorandum 25250: for all practical 
purposes, Herman and his first spouse were divorced - they 
had ceased living together, and Herman had in good faith sought 
and received a decree of divorce. 61 The Borax court held that to 
upset these "pre-existing arrangements" would be contrary to 
56. 349 F.2d at 670. 
57. The Borax court relied on the Nevada Supreme Court decision in Colby v. Colby, 
78 Nev. 150, 369 P.2d 1019, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962). In Colby, the wife received 
a Nevada divorce. Her husband went to Maryland and received an invalidation decree 
from the Maryland court. The husband then returned to Nevada to nullify the Nevada 
decree. The Nevada court denied relief, stating that it would not give "greater credit and 
respect" to a foreign decree than to a lawfully entered decree in its own state. 78 Nev. at 
157, 369 P.2d at 1023. The Colby facts illustrate how a couple can be considered married 
in one jurisdiction and divorced in another. While most courts have accepted the validity 
of the Colby holding, at least one article has questioned its constitutionality. See Spolter, 
Invalid Divorce Decree, 24 TAX L. REv. 163, 193-96 (1969). 
58. 349 F.2d at 670. 
59. 349 F.2d at 670. 
60. 198 F.2d at 260. 
61. 349 F.2d at 670-71. 
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congressional desires. 62 
Although the two Borax arguments - uniformity and reli-
ance - convincingly demonstrate that some choice of state law 
must be made, they do not necessarily explain why the law of the 
issuing jurisdiction is the best law to use. At least superficially, 
it would appear that consistent reliance on the law of a couple's 
marital domicile would serve those policy goals just as well as 
reliance on the law of the issuing jurisdiction. 63 fudeed, ten years 
after Borax the Second Circuit severely limited that opinion's 
scope in Estate of Goldwater v. Commissioner. 64 Goldwater 
looked to the law of the marital domicile, holding that the Borax 
rule applied only to the Code sections relating to alimony deduc-
tions. 65 But while the Borax-Goldwater debate continues within 
and without the Second Circuit, both sides agree to a principle 
of supreme importance to the sham doctrine question: there is no 
federal law of marriage and divorce.66 The federal courts always 
62. 349 F.2d at 671. The Borax opinion also contained dicta suggesting the possibility 
of federal procedural standards for determining the tax validity of a divorce. The Second 
Circuit noted that the Mexican concept of a divorce, although it had extreme elements, 
was not "totally alien to that contemplated by the tax laws." 349 F.2d at 672. The court 
indicated that in particularly unusual divorce proceedings, the question was not whether 
the foreign divorce would be "declared invalid in every state" but rather whether the 
divorce frustrated the tax laws. 349 F.2d at 673. 
Several commentators have concluded that Borax spawned a federal law of marriage 
and divorce for tax purposes. See generally Fried, External Pressures on Internal Revenue: 
The Effect of State Court Adjudications in Tax Litigation, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 647, 653 
(1967); Rodgers & Rodgers, The Disparity Between Due Process and Full Faith and 
Credit: The Problem of the Somewhere Wife, 67 CoLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1385 (1967); Spalter, 
supra note 57. One article has argued that Borax did not create a federal tax law of marital 
relations. See Note, 9 CoNN. L. REV. 282, 287 (1977). 
63. In fact, the majority of courts facing the Borax problem have turned to the law 
of the couple's domicile instead of the issuing jurisdiction to determine a couple's marital 
status. See, e.g., Capodanno v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 638 (1978); Irving A. Sheppard, 
32 T.C. 942 (1959). See also cases cited in note 40 supra. 
64. 539 F.2d 878 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976). 
65. 539 F.2d at 881. Goldwater may be the death knell for the Borax rule. The court 
in Goldwater declared that "Borax was concerned with the provisions of the federal in-
come tax law concerning the deductibility of alimony payments. The court carefully so 
limited its holding." 539 F.2d at 881. Therefore, the Goldwater court did not feel bound 
to apply Borax to a surviving spouse deduction in § 2057 of the Code. The Borax opinion, 
however, does not appear limited to alimony deductions. The Borax court was concerned 
with a " 'uniform construction' " of the marital status provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code. 349 F .2d at 675. By limiting Borax to a particular section of the Code, the Goldwater 
decision overlooked one of the major justifications the Borax court relied on for its rule of 
validation - a uniform marital status standard under the Code. 
66. As Judge Friendly noted in his Borax dissent, although the court was divided on 
the holding, the judges all agreed that federal courts should not "set themselves up as 
domestic relations tribunals." 349 F.2d at 676. 
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accept the view of some other jurisdiction, state or foreign; they 
do not sua sponte invalidate state divorce decrees in "these most 
collateral tax deficiency proceedings."67 
In Revenue Ruling 76-255, the IRS argues that a couple may 
comply with formal state requirements for divorce, yet continue 
to live in a inanner so indistinguishable from marriage that the 
divorce decree should be disregarded for tax purposes. 68 But a 
federal court that unilaterally invalidated a state divorce decree 
would create an independent federal law of marriage. Courts 
since Eccles have always interpreted the marriage provisions of 
the Code to avoid such a consequence. Since Congress has never 
indicated that it wants to ignore state divorce decrees, the im-
plicit IRS assumption of a clear congressional purpose is cryptic. 
B. The "Marriage Penalty" and Congressional Purpose 
Even if Congress did desire the courts to fashion a federal law 
of marital status wholly independent of state laws, Gregory re-
quires a more specific congressional purpose before the sham doc-
trine is appropriate. The Service is likely to argue that Congress 
thought that the "marriage penalty" was a necess1:1:ry evil to insti-
tute more equitable tax rates for single persons. But that alone 
is surely not a sufficiently specific purpose to warrant the use of 
the sham doctrine.69 On the other hand, the Service might argue 
that Congress wanted to iax all married couples in which both 
spouses earn significant incomes at a higher rate than similarly 
situated single couples and that the sham doctrine is the only 
feasible way to v~dicate that goal. To see whether that goal takes 
a form clear enough to justify the extraordinary measures of 
,, 
67. 349 F.2d at 670. 
68. An argument by the Commissioner for federal standards to determine marital 
status under the Code may place the Service in an embarrassing position. After the Borax 
decision, the IRS repudiated it in Rev. Rul. 67-442. According to the Ruling, the Com-
missioner: 
generally will not question for Federal income tax purposes the validity of any 
divorce decree until a court of competent jurisdiction declares the divorce to be 
invalid .... In this regard the Service will not follow the decisions in Estate of 
Herman Borax v. Commissioner and Harold E. Wondsel v. Commissioner. , . , 
G.C.M. 25250 is clarified to remove any possible implication that the Service 
will follow invalidated divorce decrees for Federal income tax purposes. 
1967-2 C.B. 65, 66. 
Of course, neither the courts nor the Service are bound by the Revenue Ruling, Estate 
of Lang v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 404, 406-07 (1975). Unfortunately for the Commis-
sioner, however, the courts have given Rev. Rul. 67-442 "general applicability." Wilson 
v. Commissioner, 35 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec, 1276, 1279 (1976). 
69. See note 37 supra and accompanying text. 
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Gregory v. Helvering, one must review the development of the tax 
laws and the confused legislative history of the 1969 Tax Reform 
Act. 
The tax laws have always sought to treat individuals with 
equal incomes equally. 70 The Revenue Act of 1913 contained only 
one schedule, which applied to all individuals.71 Similarly, the 
first joint return provision, passed in 1918, set forth one rate for 
all married couples, whether they filed separately or jointly.72 In 
the 1930s, Congress noticed that married couples living in com-
mon law states were taxed at a higher rate than those living in 
community property states.73 Community property statutes split 
a married couple's income equally between each spouse, no mat-
ter how much each spouse earned, and spared the couple's high 
earner some of the pains of progressive taxation. Desiring to tax 
all couples equally, regardless of their states of residence, Con-
gress enacted a provision in 1948 allowing all married couples 
filing a joint return to be taxed at rates that were twice what a 
single person earning one-half of the couple's joint income would 
pay. 74 By setting joint rates on a par with the rates paid in the 
community property states, Congress gave all married couples 
the advantages of income splitting. The plan admirably served 
one congressional purpose - equal taxation of all couples, re-
gardless of state of residency. Moreover, for couples in which 
both spouses earn equal incomes, it ensured equal taxes for all 
individuals, regardless of marital status. But it created a new 
discrepancy: a married individual whose spouse earned no 
income was now taxed at a much lower rate than a single 
individual. Not surprisingly, single workers cried "Foul!" 
In 1969, Congress responded to the demands of single taxpay-
ers by reducing their rates so that an individual would never pay 
more than one hundred twenty percent of the taxes paid by a 
married person with the same income. 75 Standing alone, such a 
70. See generally Jensen, The Historical Discrimination of the Federal Income Tax 
Rates, 54 TAXES 445, 452 (1976). 
71. Tariff of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166-81. 
72. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 223, 40 Stat. 1057, 1074 (1919). 
73. See Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 
1400-09 (1975); Note, Federal Income Tax Discrimination Between Married and Single 
Taxpayers, 7 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 667, 672-74 (1974). 
74. Revenue Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 80-471, ch. 168, § 301, 3 Stat. 110, 114. The 
Senate Finance Committee Report on the 1948 Revenue Act states that the adoption of 
the Act "will produce substantial geographical equalization in the impact of the tax on 
individual incomes." S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 25 (1948). 
75. S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 2. 
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change would have allowed couples in community property states 
to file separately under the new individual rates and pay less tax 
than similar couples in common law states. Careful to avoid re-
creating such a disparity, Congress qualified the 1969 amend-
ment with a rule that married couples co"Qld file separately only 
if they used the pre-1969 individual rates. 76 That rule successfully 
averted the common-law/ community-property disparity but 
inadvertently created the "marriage penalty." 
As other commentators have explained, 77 the problem is one 
of irreconcilable goals. Under a progressive tax structure, it is 
impossible to 
1) Tax all married couples equally, regardless of the distribution 
of income within the couple (the goal of the 1948 reform), 
2) Tax all single individuals at a rate little higher than the rate 
applied to an individual earning the same income but married to 
a nonearning spouse (the goal of the 1969 reform), and, 
3) Tax all married couples at rates no higher than they would 
face if they were single (the avoidance of a "marriage penalty"). 
To justify the use of the sham doctrine, the IRS might argue that 
the steps Congress took in 1969 to protect the first and second 
goals imply a clear desire to overrule the third. Such reasoning 
would have merit if at the time of its actions Congress understood 
all the implications. Such is not the case.78 During the 1972 
House Ways and Means Committee Hearings testimony diverged 
over Congress's knowledge of the existence of the marriage 
penalty when it passed the 1969 Tax Reform Act. New York 
Representative Bella Abzug testified: "The problem of the 
working married couple who must pay higher taxes than two 
single working pe_ople living together appears to be the result of 
an oversight in the drafting of the Tax Reform Act of 1969."79 
On the other hand, Iowa Representative Fred Schwengel testi-
fied, "This so-called 'marriage penalty' was noted by the tax 
writing committees at the time, but it was justified on the 
76. See Bittker, supra note 73, at 1429. 
77. See id. at 1430; Hearings, supra note 3, at 78-95 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen). 
78. As one author stated: 
[T]he historical development of the current tax rate structure raises significant 
doubt that the discrimination between married and single taxpayers is indicative 
of any conscious congressional plan or policy. Rather, it appears that the present 
allocation of tax burdens is the unintended and conglomerate result of a series of 
ad hoc congressional reactions to public pressure. 
Note, supra note 73, at 678. 
79. Hearings, supra note 3, at 122 (statement of Representative Abzug). 
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grounds that a couple's living expenses are likely to be less than 
those of two single persons. "80 
The legislative history of the 1969 Tax Reform Act supports 
the former view, if it supports either. The Senate Report that 
accompanied the Act81 is devoid of reference to a marriage pen-
alty. If such a consequence were fully intended, the absence of 
either justification or dissent would be difficult to explain.82 
Surely Congress would have recorded any clear desire to impose 
so controversial a measure as the marriage penalty.83 
But must we not presume that Congress intended all the 
necessary consequences of its actions? Perhaps. Yet we need not 
presume so strong an intent that courts should take extraordinary 
measures to vindicate it. In light of the provision's complete his-
BO. Hearings, supra note 3, at 100 (statement of Representative Schwengel). 
81. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
82. The General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, written by the staff of 
the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, is the only document related to the 
Act that mentions the marriage penalty. However, by its own admission, the General 
Explanation is not a statement of congressional intent but "an attempt by the staff to 
write the equivalent of what it believes would be the type of explanation which might have 
been prepared with respect to the legislation as finally enacted if the legislative process 
called for such an explanation." STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 
91ST CONG., lsT SESs., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM Acr OF 1969, at III (Dec. 
3, 1970). Hence the document is nothing more than an after-the-fact justification of the 
effect of the Act. Furthermore, the General Explanation's reference to the marriage pen-
alty suggests Congress was unaware of its existence at the time it passed the Act: 
With the new rate schedule for single persons, married couples filing a joint return 
will pay more tax than two single persons with the same total income. This is a 
necessary result of changing the income-splitting relationship between single and 
joint returns. Moreover, it is justified on the grounds that although a married couple 
has greater living expenses than a single person and hence should pay less tax, the 
couple's living expenses are likely to be less than those of two single persons and 
therefore the couple's tax should be higher than that of two single persons. 
Id. at 223. A statement of justification normally presupposes the author's knowledge of 
the condition justified. However, the term "moreover" indicates that Congress did not 
contemplate the living expense justification for the marriage tax when it passed the Act. 
Instead, it appears that the drafters of the General Explanation constructed what they 
felt to be a reasonable explanation for the enigmatic imposition of the marriage tax. 
83. The 1978 Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 96-600, § 101, 92 Stat. 2763, 2767 (current 
version at I.R.C. § 1), revised tax rates for married couples as well as single individuals, 
thereby reducing the "marriage tax." For example, prior to the 1978 revisions if each 
spouse earned $15,000, the couple would pay $1205 more than their single counterparts. 
Under the 1978 Act the marriage tax would be approximately $957, or about $248 less. 
Regrettably, the reports accompanying the 1978 Act do not specify whether Congress 
intended to reduce the disparity between dual-earning couples and single taxpayers. If 
anything, the revision indicates that Congress was displeased with the marriage penalty 
it had imposed nine years earlier. If Congress lacked sufficient intent to fortify the mar-
riage tax with the sham doctrine in 1969, it would be difficult to construe the 1978 Act as 
evidencing a stronger intent to do so. 
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tory, Congress's silence concerning the marriage penalty, and the 
presumption against creating a federal law of marriage, it seems 
inappropriate to take the commercial sham doctrine and apply it 
to year-end divorces. 
III. THE YEAR-END DIVORCE AND THE SUITABILITY 
OF SHAM DOCTRINE TESTS 
Even if one were to conclude that year-end divorces under-
mine a congressional purpose, one must still ask whether, given 
the personal and intimate character of marriage and divorce, the 
sham doctrine is an appropriate tool to achieve that purpose. In 
the past, courts have employed the doctrine to assess the tax 
consequences of business transactions. The remarks of the Sec-
ond Circuit are typical: "The doctrine of Gregory v. Helvering 
means that in construing words of a tax statute which describe 
commercial or industrial transactions we are to understand them 
to refer to transactions entered upon for commercial or industrial 
purposes . . . . " 84 Should this commercial doctrine be trans-
planted to the family setting? The answer should certainly turn 
in part on whether either of the current sham doctrine tests are 
properly tailored to separate cases that violate congressional pur-
poses from cases that do not. 
A. The Beneficial Interest Test 
It is not at all clear that courts using the beneficial interest 
test would ever strike down a year-end divorce and remarriage as 
a sham. Unlike those commercial transactions that courts have 
found not to change a taxpayer's position significantly, dissolu-
tion of marriage always carries significant risks that are largely 
beyond the couple's control. In many regions of the country and 
many social circles, divorce still carries a powerful stigma. That 
stigma may impair social relations with family, close friends, or 
the community at large; for some it may even impair job oppor-
84. Commissioner v. Transport Trading & Term. Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 
1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 955 (1950). At least one court, however, has suggested that 
the sham doctrine is applicable to domestic relations. In Chisholm v. Commissioner, 
Learned Hand stated that in sham cases: 
The question always is whether the transaction under scrutiny is in fact what it 
appears to be in form; a marriage may be a joke; a contract may be intended only 
to deceive others; an agreement may have a collateral defeasance. In such cases the 
transaction as a whole is different from its appearance. 
79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 641 (1935). 
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tunities. More significantly for the purposes of the beneficial in-
terest test, year-end divorce and remarriage imposes several ines-
capable financial risks, most of which are tied to the possibility 
that one or both partners might die or become incompetent dur-
ing the period of separation. If one spouse dies intestate during 
some excessive New Year's festivities, the•other will be without 
the statutory protections accorded a surviving spouse. 85 Even if 
both spouses made wills before the divorce, an untimely death 
during the separation can have many undesired effects on the 
legal dissolution of the estate, 86 including forfeiture of the estate-
tax marital deduction87 and in some jurisdictions automatic revo-
cation of all bequests to the divorced spouse.88 Finally, each party 
to a year-end divorce runs a personal risk that should not be 
ignored: the partner may enjoy being divorced fnd choose not to 
remarry. This risk is not easily quantified, and for some marriages 
a disinterested spectator might well characterize it as a possible 
fringe benefit, but it must surely play some role in the parties' 
decision to proceed with their plan. 
Of course, one might say that such risks make it clear that 
the year-end scheme is not in the "beneficial interest" of the 
parties when the tax consequences are not considered. But as we 
saw in the commercial setting, 89 the test is intended to weed out 
only those transactions that are not "significant." The courts do 
not step in and decide whether the parties were wise; they only 
decide whether the risks were so insignificant that the parties 
never moved their eyes from the Internal Revenue Code. It is hard 
to imagine any year-end divorce and remarriage fitting that de~ 
scription. 
85. See, e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-102. 
86. It will not help the Service if the Court limits its evaluation of the risks attendant 
to a divorce to financial considerations. Perhaps even more significant than the social 
col\l!equences of a divorce are the economic ones. If the couple does not remarry, they may 
lose the benefits of spousal insurance policies and social security benefits. Property held 
by tenancy in the entirety may become a tenancy in common. Although some of these risks 
might be reduced by contracts prior to the year-end divorce, many - such as federal 
benefits - cannot be controlled. For a general discussion of some of the economic risks 
in a year-end divorce, see Feld, Divorce, Tax-Style, 54 TAXES 608, 610 (1976). 
87. I.R.C. § 2056. 
88. See, e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-508. Even in those states without statutory 
revocation provisions, a divorce greatly magnifies the threat of a will contest by other 
devisees of the will. See, e.g., In re Estate of Blanchard, 391 Mich. 644, 218 
N.W.2d 37 (1974); Caswell v. Kent, 158 Me. 493, 186 A.2d 581 (1962). For a general 
discussion and collection of cases concerning the effects of divorce on a will, see R. WELL-
MAN, L. WAGGONER & 0. BROWDER, PALMER'S TRusTS & SuccESSIONs.231-48 (3d ed. 1978). 
89. See text at notes 24-31 supra. 
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B. The Motive Test 
The beneficial interest test is objectionable because there 
may be no year-end divorce and remarriage schemes that would 
violate its standards. In contrast, the motive test would surely 
strike down some such schemes. Nonetheless, the motive test 
may still not be an appropriate way to vindicate a congressional 
desire to impose a marriage penalty. 
The motive test is invasive. It requires a court to probe the 
desires of an individual by seeking circumstantial evidence of 
purpose. In a commercial context, courts have tolerated the test 
where that evidence was easily obtained. In Gregory, for example, 
the Supreme Court found the reorganization to be tax-motivated 
by exploring the business records of Averill and discovering that 
the company performed no business functions and served no eco-
nomic purpose apart from gaining a tax benefit. 90 But when the 
circumstances are murkier, courts have shunned motive investi-
gations even in commercial contexts. In Granite Trust Co. v. 
United States, 91 a corporate taxpayer wanted to liquidate a 
wholly owned subsidiary. To ensure that the liquidation would 
not create a nonrecognizable loss under section 112(b) of the 1939 
Code92 or section 332 of the 1954 Code, 93 the company reduced its 
ownership to less than 80% by selling shares to friends who knew 
the company would be liquidated. The IRS challenged the trans-
action as circuitous and without "independent purpose," but the 
First Circuit held otherwise: 
To strike down these sales on the alleged defect that they took 
place between friends and for tax motives would only tend to pro-
mote duplicity and result in extensive litigation as taxpayers led 
courts into hairsplitting investigations to decide when a sale was 
not a sale. It is no answer to argue that, under Gregory v. Helver-
ing, there is an inescapable judicial duty to examine into the ac-
tuality of purported corporate reorganizations, for that was a spe-
cial sort of transaction, whose bona fides could readily be ascer-
tained by inquiring whether the ephemeral new corporation was in 
fact transacting business, or whether there was in fact a continu-
ance of the proprietary interests under an altered corporate form.0j 
It is difficult to imagine a more hair-splitting investigation 
90. As one author noted, the facts in Gregory were "entirely clear." R. PAUL, STUDIES 
IN FEDERAL TAXATION 152 (1937). 
91. 238 F.2d 670 (1st Cir. 1956). 
92. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(b), 53 Stat. 36. 
93. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 332, 68 Stat. 102. 
94. 238 F.2d at 677-78. 
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than one to seek the impetus behind a valid divorce. One com-
mentator has described the factual problems in adversarial di-
vorce litigation in a manner that illuminates the even greater 
difficulties present here: "Truth is not discernible in a divorce 
case since the factual history of a crumbling marriage is usually 
too complex to allow the assessment of facts in terms of truth or 
untruth. "95 But at least in divorce litigation, the parties with 
access to the information are opposed, and therefore have incen-
tives to present evidence on both sides of disputed issues. In tax 
litigation, the parties have no incentive to go beyorid presentation 
of the state decree of divorce and any evidence they may have 
produced to gain that decree. 98 
Possibly out of sensitivity to these problems, the Commis-
sioner seems to have set a limit to the types of year-end divorces 
the IRS will challenge. In Letter Ruling 7835076, 97 a couple asked 
the Service whether it would challenge a purely tax-motivated 
divorce where the parties continued to cohabit but did not re-
marry. Although the Commissioner noted that the only change in 
the couple's lives would be a purely legal one, he stated that the 
Service would not challenge the divorce. 98 That position is reas-
suring, but it draws a line that is not defensible as an expression 
of the motive test's standards to advance a congressional purpose. 
If Congress wanted the IRS to apply a sham doctrine motive test 
95. Feldman, A Statutory Proposal to Remove Divorce from the Courtroom, 29 ME. 
L. REV. 25, 31 (1977). . 
96. In states where grounds are required, the decree would evidence the existence of 
other motivations for the divorce besides a reduction of taxes. Even no-fault states require 
a demonstration that " 'there has been a breakdown. of the marriage relationship to the 
extent that the legitimate objects of marriage have been destroyed and there remains no 
reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved' " before a court grants a decree 
of divorce. Raphael, Frank, & Wilder, Divorce in America: The Erosion of Fault, 81 DICK. 
L. REV. 719, 729 (1977). 
An interesting question is whether the courts will extend the general presumptions 
presently enjoyed by the Commissioner to ease the difficulty of proof for the Service, and 
if so, what weight the courts will give the valid state decree. Case law demonstrates two 
burden-shifting devices. The first is the general rule that the Commissioner "has the 
support of a presumption of correctness, and the petitioner [taxpayer] has the burden of 
proving it to be wrong." Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). This presumption 
has been extended by some courts to sham questions. For example, see Hoffman Motors 
Corp. v. United States, 473 F.2d 254,_258 (2d Cir. 1973). The second doctrine that may 
benefit the Service is that transactions between family members which reduce taxes are 
subject to strict scrutiny. See Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1940); Commis-
sioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 291 (1946). However, because year-end divorces would 
regain such strict scrutiny, courts may balk at the invitation to enmesh themselves further 
into intimate family relations. 
97. Ltr. Rul. 7835076 (June 1, 1978). 
98. Id. 
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to protect the marriage penalty, it surely would expect the Ser-
vice to strike down all tax-motivated divorces, whether or not 
the couple remarried later. For purposes of the motive test, the 
letter ruling's hypothetical, which stipulated a tax-motivated 
divorce, is indistinguishable from the situation governed by 
Revenue Ruling 76-255. 
Perhaps the Commissioner issued the letter ruling to avoid 
being forced later to decide when a couple that divorces and 
cohabits becomes "divorced" for tax purposes. Unfortunately, 
Revenue Ruling 76-255 imposes a similar problem: to decide how 
long a cohabiting couple must remain divorced before it is pre-
sumed that the parties did not intend to remarry at the time of 
their divorce. Perhaps the Commissioner did not want to become 
entangled in difficult factual investigations to distinguish 
friendly divorces from tax-motivated divorces. But as we have 
seen above, 99 such a consideration could affect challenges to year-
end divorces under Revenue Ruling 76-255. It seems clear that the 
Commissioner's line is one of administrative and evidentiary con-
venience. If, at some future date, the IRS chose to challenge a 
divorce under circumstances similar to those treated in the letter 
ruling, 100 it could surely find every bit as much support from the 
motive te.st as it presently finds for Revenue Ruling 76-255. 101 
Thus, application of the motive standard to year-end di-
vorces authorizes the IRS and the courts to delve into the domes-
tic affairs of any divorced couple. If used to promote a congres-
sional desire to tax married couples more heavily than single 
individuals, it is alarmingly open-ended. Notwithstanding Letter 
Ruling 7835076, the test itself suggests no dividing lines and mires 
courts in domestic inquiries that they have studiously avoided in 
other tax cases.102 It then forces them to create a federal marital 
status despite the longstanding tradition of relying on the marital 
status determinations of a state or foreign jurisdiction to make 
federal tax decisions. Thus, the motive test seems an undesirable 
way to apply the sham doctrine to year-end divorce and remar-
riage. 
99. See text at notes 95-96 supra. 
100. Similar to a revenue ruling, the private ruling is not binding on the Commis-
sioner nor on the courts. See Rev. Proc. 76-29, 1976-2 C.B. 646. 
101. By restricting the advantages of a tax-related divorce in Ltr. Ru!. 7835076 (June 
1, 1978), the Commissioner has already forced tax factors into the decision to remarry. 
The possibility of a more extensive application of the Rev. Ru!. 76-255 position would 
further hamper socially desirable reconciliation since resumed relations would raise the 
specter of a tax penalty. 
102. See notes 39-62 supra and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
Revenue Ruling 76-255 seems misconceived. Although courts 
have established that local law determines marital status for tax 
purposes, the Ruling invokes sham doctrine to challenge divorces 
issued according to proper local procedures. The doctrine does not 
fit the gap into which the Internal Revenue Service has tried to 
wedge it. In commercial contexts, it is used to protect a clear 
congressional purpose; however, it is debatable that Congress in-
tended to question valid state divorce decrees and to create a 
marriage penalty. Furthermore, even if a year-end divorce and 
remarriage scheme contravenes a congressional desire, the sham 
doctrine is not an appropriate remedy. Neither of the sham doc-
trine tests adequately explains the Commissioner's analysis of 
different year-end divorce situations, and any form of sham anal-
ysis would require courts to pierce the marriage veil with an ana-
lytic knife previously reserved for commercial transactions. 103 
Under the beneficial interest test, a year-end divorce would never 
be stricken as a sham because it inevitably exposes the couple to 
substantial, albeit brief, risks associated with loss of the legal, 
economic, and emotional benefits of marriage. The motive test, 
on the other hand, would plunge courts into hair-spliJ;ting factual 
investigations under circumstances inconducive to productive 
inquiry. Whatever a couple's motivations for divorce, is it appro-
priate to expose them to IRS scrutiny?104 And should a couple that 
103. Applying the sham doctrine necessarily injects uncertainty into relations, 
whether commercial or domestic. Herman Fuller has described succinctly the tradeoff 
between fully enforcing congressional desires through the sham doctrine and uncertainty: 
If [sham cases] are limited in application to the extreme situations in which they 
originate, they do not solve the problems which give rise to them; if they are applied 
more sweepingly by an activist judiciary, the impossibility of predicting the out-
come of more questionable cases tends to undermine certainty. 
Fuller, supra note 32, at 375. While we begrudgingly tolerate a limited amount of uncer-
tainty in business transactions, it is especially troubling in family relations. Indeed, the 
history of the Internal Revenue Code is replete with condemnations of interference with 
such intimate decisions. For example, when Congress was considering a mandatory joint 
return in 1941 to combat the inequalities created by community property states, the critics 
clamored their disapproval: "Of course, the provision was 'un-American.' The contention 
was that by making the marital relation a taxable privilege the 'sly and tricky' provision 
was arbitrary and against public policy in that it struck at the institution of marriage, 
was an attack upon the family, and promoted celibacy.'' R. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 275 (1954). 
104. Some observers believe that overly intrusive divorce proceedings (and by anal-
ogy, overly intrusive inquiries into the validity of a divorce by the IRS) may seriously 
undermine the institution of marriage: 
The requirement of disclosing in open court or in the lawyer's office any of the 
various grounds for divorce such as adultery, intemperance, or cruelty entails a 
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is deemed divorced and free to remarry by the court of their 
marital domicile be deemed joined in the bonds of matrimony for 
federal tax purposes? 
Admittedly, year-end divorce and remarriage schemes are 
troublesome tax avoidance devices. They violate notions of fair 
play and equity. But if Congress is genuinely offended by the 
schemes, it can attack them through direct, bright-line rules.•0:; 
The IRS should not be allowed to lead the assault by applying a 
business doctrine to the most intimate societal unit. 
public exposure of the most intimate and often embarrassing details of married 
life •... Such state-sponsored invasions of privacy in divorce contests can only 
demean the marriage relationship, humiliate the parties, and damage the residual 
family relationships, whatever the outcome of the contest. 
Goldstein & Gitter, Divorce Without Blame, 30 HUMANISTS No. 3, 12, 14 (1970). 
105. If Congress genuinely believes that year-end divorce schemes frustrate its pur-
pose, the solution is remarkably simple. Section 143 could be amended to provide that a 
person must be single at least six months of the calendar year in order to qualify for singles 
tax rates. Congress's failure to adopt this device when it first passed § 143 suggests that 
it was not so concerned with whether a taxpayer's marital status for tax purposes reflects 
that person's legal marital status for most of the year. Instead, Congress only wanted a 
simple, straightforward rule for ascertaining marital status for tax purposes. Thus, it chose 
to rely upon an individual's legal marital status as of a given date-December 31. If 
Congress now finds the rule too lax, it should not rely on the courts to tighten it, See 
Hanover Bank v. Commissioner, 369 U.S. 672, 688 n.23 (1962), where the Court stated: 
We believe the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was correct when it said in 
Fabreeka Products Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 876, 879: "Granting the govern-
ment's proposition that these taxpayers have found a hole in the dike, we believe 
it one that calls for the application of the congressional thumb, not the court's," 
